We already know from real-world AV elections that voters largely prefer to vote honestly, there’s no reason to think they would get more strategic when it gets harder to figure out the optimal strategy.
In plain AV, voting honestly is the optimal strategy - there’s no incentive to vote any other way. It’s not for SPAV. And yes, strategic voting in SPAV is harder to figure out than strategic voting in FPTP, but it’s far from impossible - basically you don’t vote for a popular candidate you support so your vote for other candidates counts for more, relying on the assumption that enough other people will vote for the popular candidate you support to allow them to win anyways.
Strategic voting can be an optional strategy under ordinary approval voting. If I don’t like either of the top two candidates, it’s still in my best interest to vote for the runner-up, if I hate them less than I hate the front-runner.
And look man, I’m honestly not interested in picking over the details. Any proportional system is better than single-winner. By miles.
In plain AV, voting honestly is the optimal strategy - there’s no incentive to vote any other way. It’s not for SPAV. And yes, strategic voting in SPAV is harder to figure out than strategic voting in FPTP, but it’s far from impossible - basically you don’t vote for a popular candidate you support so your vote for other candidates counts for more, relying on the assumption that enough other people will vote for the popular candidate you support to allow them to win anyways.
Strategic voting can be an optional strategy under ordinary approval voting. If I don’t like either of the top two candidates, it’s still in my best interest to vote for the runner-up, if I hate them less than I hate the front-runner.
And look man, I’m honestly not interested in picking over the details. Any proportional system is better than single-winner. By miles.